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RECENT

ERISA

CASE

preempts Illinois law for HMO claims

By Dana Rhodes
In Anderson v. Humana, Inc., 24
F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 1994), the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals held that
health maintenace organization
("HMO") subscribers cannot state a
claim for damages under Illinois law
for statements relating to a medical
benefits package regulated by the
Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §
1144. In its ruling, the court recognized that ERISA preempts state
claims challenging deceptive
information practices by HMOs.
Furthermore, it found no exemption
to ERISA preemption exists for such
claims under provisions allowing
states to regulate insurance.

Complaint dismissed
Vernita Anderson enrolled in the
Humana-Michael Reese HMO
offered as part of her employer's
medical benefits package. Subsequently, she filed a complaint in
state court against the HMO and its
sponsor, Humana Inc., alleging
fraud in violation of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act, Illinois
Complied Statutes chapter 815,
section 505, and state common law.
In her complaint, Anderson contended that HMOs were deceptive by
nature, or alternatively, that the
information HMOs provided to
prospective enrollees failed to
explain accurately the incentive
structures under which they operate.
The complaint sought damages on
behalf of a class of persons who
elected the Humana HMO over
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another health provider. The
defendant HMO quickly removed the
action to federal court, contending
that the information employees use
to select HMO benefits "relates to" a
plan regulated by ERISA, which
explicitly preempts state remedies.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that
the suit was properly removed to
federal court. Furthermore, it
dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted as Anderson, basing
her claim solely on preempted state
law, declined to address the ERISA
issue. In making its ruling, the
district court failed to certify a class
action, treating Anderson as the sole
plaintiff. Anderson then made a
timely appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit addressed
this failure to certify the class action.
Ordinarily, when a lower court
reserves decision on certifying a
class action, its ruling on the merits
of the case is not final. Only final
rulings are appealable. In this case,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the district court reserved no issue
for further decision. As a result, the
lower court's decision was final and
the matter was properly appealable.
This allowed the Seventh Circuit to
find it had jurisdiction over the case.
ERISA

preempts state law

Turning to the merits of the case,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of
Anderson's complaint. It held that

her state law claim was both
preempted and properly removed to
federal court.
In beginning its analysis, the
circuit court found that preemption
was proper under the rationale of
MetropolitanLife Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
481 U.S. 58 (1987). In Metropolitan,
the United States Supreme Court
held that because ERISA expressly
preempts state law, a claim involving a plan regulated by ERISA cannot
avoid removal to federal court even
when presented as a state claim.
Applying the Court's reasoning to
the present facts, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that Anderson's claim,
involving an HMO plan regulated by
ERISA, could properly be removed
even though it was originally pled as
a violation of Illinois state law.
Moreover, the court recognized
that any lawsuit attempting to
control information about benefits
provided by employers to employees
falls squarely within ERISA's
preemption clause. It concluded that
Anderson's suit attempted to change
the type or amount of information
provided by employers to employees
regarding Humana's HMO. Therefore, her claim was clearly preempted by federal law.

No preemption limits
On appeal, Anderson argued that
Humana should be held to the
Illinois standards for insurers. She
contended that HMOs spread risk
across patients and time like other
insurers, and therefore, should be
exempt from ERISA regulation.
In determining whether
Anderson's claim fell within a state

Volume 7, number I

regulation of insurance exemption,
the circuit court acknowledged that
the ERISA preemption clause has
limits, the principal one reserving
state authority to regulate insurance.
However, after reviewing the
definitions of "insurance" and
"regulation," the circuit court found
Anderson's argument unpersuasive.
Because ERISA failed to define either
"insurance" or "regulation," the
court turned to a similar statute, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which also
permits state regulation of insurance,
for guidance. On the basis of this
statute, the court determined that
"insurance" requires a risk pooling

component and state regulation is
restricted to this domain.
Anderson, however, had not
relied on any state law regulating the
methods of pooling risks or prices to
be charged in her complaint. Rather,
she had based her argument on an
all-purpose truth-in-business
statute. Finding this statute more
applicable to used car salesmen and
promotional literature for vacuum
cleaners than HMOs, the court

reasoned that the truth-in-business
statute did not directly apply to
insurance at all. Therefore, it held
that her complaint did not fall within

an exception to ERISA preemption on
the basis of the state authority to
regulate insurance.
The court concluded that
Anderson's state law claim, relating
to a medical benefits package
regulated by ERISA, was preempted

by federal law. Furthermore, the
circuit court did not find any
exemption to federal preemption
based on state authority to regulate
insurance. It affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Anderson's
claim for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.

Car lessees' early-termination rights spelled out
By JenniferL. Fitzgerald
In Highsmith v. Chrysler CreditCorp., 18 F.3d 434
(7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a cause of action under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act accrues when an automobile
lessee knows or reasonably should have known that the
lessor misrepresented its rights and liabilities to the
lessee. Moreover, the court found that a lessee, demonstrating no intent to terminate an automobile lease,
lacks standing to seek a declaratory judgment on
whether an early termination provision violates state
law. However, the court recognized a lessee's right to
state a claim for inadequate disclosure of the contract's
termination formula and any manufacturer's warranties
under the Consumer Leasing Act.

Harmful provisions
The plaintiffs in this consolidated action, Kevin and
Macita Highsmith and Joseph Villasenor, each signed a
consumer automobile lease with the Chrysler Credit
Corporation ("Chrysler"). In both cases the disputed
lease stated that the lessee, on either condition of
default or early termination, would be liable for early
termination charges calculated according to the provisions of the lease.
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Kevin and Macita Highsmith signed a four-year
lease for a Plymouth Sundance on March 10, 1987.
Eighteen months later they filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and named Chrysler as one of their
creditors. The bankruptcy court entered an order
rejecting the lease and Chrysler repossessed the
automobile. On April 25, 1989, Chrysler, having sold
the automobile, determined that the Highsmiths had
terminated their lease. It contended that the Highsmiths
were liable for an additional $5,400 in penalty fees
under the early termination provisions of their lease.
Chrysler subsequently filed suit in state court to
recover the alleged deficiency. However, after the
Highsmiths refiled their bankruptcy petition, Chrysler
dismissed its complaint to comply with the conditions
of the bankruptcy proceeding. The Highsmiths then
brought an adversary action against Chrysler, alleging
that the automobile lease violated both federal and state
law. The bankruptcy court found these claims beyond
the scope of its jurisdiction, and the suit was moved to
federal court.
Subsequently, the Highsmiths amended their
complaint, adding Joseph Villasenor as a plaintiff.
Villasenor, like the Highsmiths, had signed a four-year
lease with Chrysler. However, he did not seek to
terminate this lease nor did he express any intent to do
so. Rather, Villasenor only sought a declaratory
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